Logical inference starts with concluding that if B implies A, and B is true, then A is true as well. To describe probabilistic inference rules, we must therefore define the probability of an implication $'A if B". There exist two different approaches to denning this probability, and these approaches lead to different probabilistic inference rules: We may interpret the probability of an implication as the conditional probability P ( A I B ) , i n which case we get Bayesian inference. We may also interpret this probability as the probability of t h e material implication AV -B, in which case we get different inference rules. In this paper, we develop a general approach t o describing the probability of an implication, and we describe the corresponding general formulas, of which Bayesian and material implications are particular cases. This general approach is naturally formulated in terms of t-norms, a terms which is normally encountered i n fuzzy logic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intuitively, when we say that an implication "A if B" ( A t B ) is true, we mean that whenever B is true, we can therefore conclude that A is true as well. In other words, implication is what enables us to perform logical inference.
In many practical situations, we have some confidence in B, but we are not 100% confident that B is true. Similarly, we may not be 100% sure that the implication A t B is true. In such situations, we can estimate the probability P ( B ) that B is true, and the probability P ( A t E ) that an implication A t B is true. How can we perform logical inference in such situations? Intuitively, we expect to be able to conclude that in this case, A should also be true with a certain probability; this probability should tend to 1 as the probabilities P ( B ) and P ( A t B ) tend to 1.
How can we extend logical implication to the probabilistic case? Depending on how we interpret the probability of an implication, we get two different There are two known answers to this question, and these answers are different because they use different formalizations of the probability of implication. The first answer from Bayesian approach, in which P ( A t B ) is interpreted as the conditional probability P ( A I B); see, e.g., [7] . The second answer comes from logical reasoning (see, e.g., [5] ), where the probability P ( A t B) is interpreted as the probability of the corresponding "material implication", i.e., the probability P(AV-.B) that either A is true or B is false.
From the purely logical viewpoint, the second answer may sound more reasonable, but there are examples where the first answer is in better accordance with common sense. Indeed, suppose that we are analyzing animals in a national park, and we are looking for a probability of the implication A t B, where A is "the animal is a white", and B is "the animal is a tiger". In plain English, the probability of the statement " A if B" is naturally interpreted as a probability that a tiger is white. If out of 10,000 animals, 100 are tigers, and 10 of these tigers are white, then, in commonsense terms, the probability that a tiger is white is 10/100=0.1. This is exactly the probability provided by the Bayesian approach. However, the logical approach produces a different result: the probability of AV-B, i.e., the probability that an animal is either white or not a tiger is equal to 9,910/10,000=0.991 -b e cause the statement AV -.B is true not only for 10 white tigers, hut also for 9,900 animals which are not tigers.
This examples show that there is not a single "correct" probabilistic interpretation of an implication, but depending on the situation, different interpretations may be reasonable. It is therefore desirable to provide a comparative analysis of different interpretations.
In [3, 61 , it was shown that the above two interpretations can be presented as particular cases of a more general approach, in which the difference corresponds to the difference between different t-norm-like operations (for detailed information on t-norms, see, e.g., [Z, 41).
In this paper, we describe this general approach in precise terms, and we describe all possible implication opera tions covered by this approach and the corresponding logical inference rules. Specifically, in Section 11, we overview the main properties of Bayes formalism, in Section 111, we overview how logical implication can be described in similar terms, and in Section IV, we describe the corresponding general approach to probability of implication. Several auxiliary results are presented in Section V. The main ideas of the proofs of the results from Section IV are described in Section VI.
BAYESIAN APPROACH: A BRIEF REMINDER
In Bayesian approach, we interpret the probability of an implication as the conditional probability hence
P ( E ) = P ( E I H i ) . P ( H i ) + ...+ P(EIH,).P(Hn), (8)
and therefore, the formula (6) take the familiar Bayes
P ( A & B ) P ( B )
.
P(E I Hi) . P(Hi) P ( E I H i ) . P ( H i ) + ...+ P(EIHn).P(Hn)'
Due to this formula, if we know the probability P(B) of B and the probability P ( A I B ) of the implication, then we can reconstruct the probability P ( A & B) that 
P ( A I B ) . P ( B ) = P ( E I A ) . P ( A ) .

(3)
This formula is the essence of the well-known Bayes theorem. In this theorem, we have a comprehensive list of n incompatible hypotheses HI,. . . , H,, and we know the the probability and the fact that A and -A are incompatible, we conclude that P ( B ) = P ( A & B ) + P ( i A & B ) .
Therefore,
P ( A & B ) = P ( B ) -P ( T A & B ) .
(10) We want to know how these prior probabilities change when we make observe some evidence E.
We w u m e that, for each of these hypotheses H i , we ~h~ formula is similar to the formula (2): both formulas know the conditional probability P ( E I Hi) that under this hypothesis, we will observe the evidence E. What can be described as
P ( A & B ) = P ( A t B ) @ P ( B ) (13)
we want to describe is the updated probability P(H; I E) with which the hypothesis Hi is true in the situation when the evidence E Was actually observed. According to the formula (3), for some binary operation a@b. h the formula (2) -which corresponds to the Bayesian case -we used the function
(14) P ( H i I E ) . P ( E ) = P ( E I H i ) . P ( H i ) ,
therefore, So, to determine the desired posterior probability
P ( H , ( E ) , we must know P ( E ( H , ) , P(H;), and P(E).
We know P ( E I H i ) and &'(Hi). The only value that we do not know yet is P ( E ) , but this value is easy to determine: since the hypotheses are incompatible, and their list is comprehensive, we conclude that
+P(E&H,). (7)
Due to formula ( l ) , we have
In the formula (12) -which corresponds to the logical implication cases ~ we used the operation aOb = a+b-1.
Since the meaning of the operation 0 is to transform probabilities into a new probability, and probabilities only take values from the interval [0,1], it is reasonable to require that the operation aOb always takes the values from
not always satisfy this requirement, because when a and b are both, say, less than 0.5, we have a + b -1 < 0. This does not affect our application because we always have P(B) + P ( A v T B ) 2 1. However, to make the operation a 0 b everywhere defined as a function from probabilities to probabilities, it is reasonable to set its value to 0 when a + b -1 < 0, i.e., to consider a new operation (15) 
P ( E & H , ) = P ( E I H i ) . P ( H , ) ,
where a 0 b is the inverse operation to 0, i.e., an operation for which (a 8
It is worth mentioning that for a general t-norm 0, the corresponding inverse operation 0 is usually called a fuzzy implication [2, 41.
For multiplication (14), the inverse operation is division a 0 b = a / b (as used in the formula (6)). To make sure that the values of this operation stays within the interval For our particular operation (15), the inverse operation is
here, similarly to the case of division, we added min(1,. . .)
to make sure that the value of this operation stays within the interval [0,1].
Due to formula (7) and the fact that
we get an expression for P ( E ) :
P ( E ) = P ( E t H i ) O P ( H i ) + ...+ P ( E t Hn)QP(Hn).
So, we conclude that P(Hi t E ) = ( P ( E t Hi) 0 P(Hi))B ( P ( E t H I ) 0 P(H1) + . . . + P ( E t Hn) 0 P ( H n ) ) .
(19)
This is a direct logical analogue of the Bayes theorem.
A. General Definition
Let us describe a general definition of the probability P ( A t B ) . This probability should only depend on the events A and E . Thus, our first requirement is that once we know the probabilities of all possible Boolean combinations A and B , we should be able to determine the desired probability P ( A t B ) .
It is well known that in order to determine the probabilities of all possible Boolean combinations of A and B , it is sufficient to know the probabilities P ( Thus, we can define a general implication operation as a function of these four probabilities: Definition 1. By a probability distribution P , we mean a quadrupleofnon-negativevaluesP11, PIO, POI, andPo0 for which 51 + PIO + POI + Po0 = 1. The set of all probability distributions is denoted by P. De5nition 2. By an probabilistic logical opemtion, we mean a function F : P -t [0,1]. For every two events A and B , the result of applying the probabilistic logical operation F is then delined as 
F ( P ) gf F ( P ( A & B ) , P ( A & +), P ( -A & B ) , P ( T A & TB)).
P ( A t B).
Another condition describing implication is that if when B always implies A, i.e., when -A & B is impossible (i.e., when P ( 7 A & B) = POI = 0 ) , then A t B must be true with probability 1. Definition 3. We say that two probability distributions P and P' are equivalent when B is true if P11 = Pi1 and Definition 4. We say that a probabilistic logical operation F is an implication opemtion if the following two conditions hold: F ( P ) = F(P') for all pairs P and P' that are equivLet us describe these conditions formally: 
Since
POI = P (~A & B ) = P ( B ) -P ( A & B ) = P . i -J ' i i ,
where we denoted P*l -P ( B ) , we can reformulated Proposition 1 as follows: Proposition 1'. A probabilistic logical opemtion F is an implication operation if and only if F depends on only two variables P11 andP.1, i.e., if F ( P ) = g(P11,P.l) for some function g of two voriables for which g(P11,Pll) = 1 for all values P l l .
Thus, to describe all possible implication operations, we must describe the corresponding functions of two variables.
C. Natural Implication Operations
Since we are considering the probabilistic uncertainty, it is reasonable to consider not only individual events A, A', etc., but also "composites" (probabilistic combinations) of such events. The general idea behind such combinations is that we take a lottery with a certain probabilityp and then pick A if the lottery succeeds and A' otherwise. According to the probability theory, the probability of the resulting event A is equal to def P ( 2 ) = p . P ( A ) + ( 1 -p ) . P(A').
(22)
It is also true that
P(AI&B) = p -P ( A & B ) + (1 -p ) . P ( A ' & B ) . (23)
It is natural to require that in this case, if we keep the same condition B, tken the probability of an implication with the conclusion A should also be equal to the similar probabilistic combination: P ( X t B ) = p . P ( A t B) + (1 -p ) . P ( A ' t B) . (24) This requirements can be formulated as follows: Definition 5. An implication operation g(&,P,1) is called natural if for every four real numbers S I , P;l, P.1, and p, we have 9 b . P l l + (1 -P) . P ; l , P * l ) = P -9 ( p 1 1 , P . 1 ) + (1 -P ) .~( P ; , , P .~) . 
D. Final Result: Natural Implication Operations
Corresponding to Commutative Aggregation Rule Due to Proposition 2, for each natural implication g, if we k n~w a %~P ( A tB)=g(P1l,P.l)andbsfP(B) z P . 1 , then we can reconstruct the probability t %f P ( A & B ) = 5 1 . Indeed, in terms of a, b, and t, the formula (26) has the form b -t a=l---.
P ( A & B ) = t ( P ( A t B ) , P ( B ) ) ,
where we denoted
The function t(a, b) describe an aggregation operation whose intuitive meaning (as we mentioned earlier) is "and". Since " A and B" means the same as " B and A", it is reasonable to require that this aggregation operation be commutative:
Definition 6. We say that a natural implication operation (26) corresponds to a commutative aggregation rule if the corresponding aggregation operation (28) if commutative.
Proposition 3. A natural implication corresponds to a commutatiue aggregation rule if and only if has the following form:
E. Conclusions and Discussions
Both the Bayes formula and the logical implication are covered by the formula (29): the Bayes formula corresponds to a = 0, and the logical implication formula corresponds to a = 1.
Thus, our conclusion is that natural requirements determine a 1-parametric family of formulas for the probability of implication, formulas which are intermediate between the two extreme cases: Bayesian and logical. One can easily check that for a = 0, we get the Bayes' inverse a/b, and for a = 1, we get the inverse operation 1 + a -b corresponding to the logical implication.
How can we interpret these new aggregation operations? One can show that if we "renormalize" the probabilities by using a transformation P --f s ( P ) = (1 -a ) . P + a , (31) then in this new scale, the aggregation operation (30) becomes a simple product: s(a @ b) = s(a) . s(b).
The rescaling (31) makes perfect sense (see, e.g., [l] ). Indeed, one of the natural methods to ascribe the subjective probability P ( A ) to a statement A is to take several ( N ) experts, and ask each of them whether he or she b e lieves that A is true. If N ( A ) of them answer "yes", we take d(A) = N ( A ) / N as the desired certainty value. If all the experts believe in A, then this value is 1 (=loo%), if half of them believe in A , then t(A) = 0.5 (50%), etc.
Knowledge engineers want the system to include the knowledge of the entire scientific community, so they ask as many experts as possible. But asking too many experts leads to the following negative phenomenon: when the opinion of the most respected professors, Nobel-prize winners, etc., is known, some less self-confident experts will not be brave enough to express their own opinions, so they will rather follow the majority. How does their presence influence the resulting subjective probability?
Let N denote the initial number of experts, N ( A ) the number of those of them who believe in A, and M the number of shy experts added. Initially, d(A) = N ( A ) Thus, each new operation can be simply interpreted as the Bayesian operation but in a different probability scale natural for expert systems.
V. AUXILIARY RESULT
In the previous text, we described how, knowing P(B) and P ( A e B), we can reconstruct the probability P ( A & B )
as P(a t B ) 0 P ( B ) . A natural question is: what if we want to reconstruct the probability P ( A ) instead? Since we know A(B) and P(A& B), this means that we know, out of all cases in which B is true, in what portion of them A is also true. To get the probability of A, we must also know when A is true for cases in which B is false, i.e., we must also know the probability P ( A & i B ) . Then, we will be able to reconstruct the total probability P ( A ) of A as
P ( A ) = P ( A & B ) + P ( A & i B ) .
(32) It is also possible for P ( A & -B) to take any value Thus, due to formula (Bl), the only information that we have about the probability P ( A ) is that this probability belongs to the interval
P ( A ) E P ( A ) er [ P -( A ) , P + ( A ) ] ,
this case, P(A&-B) = P(+) = 1 -P ( B ) . (1 -a) . b.
Substituting this expression into (26), we get the desired formula. The proposition is proven.
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